A Kink that Makes You Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System by Böckerman, Petri et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Kink that Makes You Sick: the Effect
of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social
Insurance System
Petri Bo¨ckerman and Ohto Kanninen and Ilpo Suoniemi
30 December 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61010/
MPRA Paper No. 61010, posted 30 December 2014 23:59 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aboa Centre for Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 97 
Turku 2014 
 
The Aboa Centre for Economics is a joint 
initiative of the economics departments of the 
University of Turku and Åbo Akademi 
University.  
 
 
Petri Böckerman, Ohto Kanninen, 
and Ilpo Suoniemi 
A Kink that Makes you Sick: the 
Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in 
a Social Insurance System 
 Copyright © Author(s)  
ISSN 1796-3133 
Printed in Uniprint 
Turku 2014 
Petri Böckerman, Ohto Kanninen, and Ilpo 
Suoniemi 
A Kink that Makes you Sick: the Effect of Sick 
Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System 
 
Aboa Centre for Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 97 
December 2014 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance 
system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect 
to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal 
sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear 
policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past 
earnings allows identification of the causal effect using a 
regression  kink  design.  Using  a  large  administrative  dataset,  we  
find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically 
significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of 
sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social 
insurance system is on the order of 1. 
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1. Introduction 
  
Absenteeism causes a substantial loss of working time worldwide. In some OECD 
countries nearly 10% of annual working days are lost because of sickness absence (DICE 
Database, 2012).1 The costs are considerable for the individual, employers, co-workers, 
and health and benefit systems. Sickness absence is also a source of major indirect costs, 
because it increases the risk of withdrawing from the labor force (e.g. Kivimäki et al. 
2004).  
 
A sickness insurance system protects individuals from earnings losses. Among cash 
benefits, sickness insurance is one of the most important social protection schemes in 
Europe (Eurostat, 2011). The key policy parameter is the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio 
of sickness insurance benefits to past earnings. 
 
We examine the effect of the replacement rate of the Finnish sickness insurance on the 
duration of sickness absence. We find a substantial and robust behavioral effect. The 
statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence 
with respect to the replacement rate is 0.83 or 1.41, depending on the model 
specification.  
 
The elasticity of the duration of sickness absence is a relevant parameter of an optimal 
sickness insurance system (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006). The replacement rate directly 
affects workers’ financial incentives to be absent from work at the intensive margin of 
labor supply through a moral hazard effect. 
                                               
1 Treble and Barmby (2011) provide an overview. 
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We use Regression Kink Design (RKD, see Section 4) to identify the causal effect of the 
replacement rate. Unlike in most other countries (Frick and Malo, 2008, p. 510-511), the 
compensation level of sickness insurance in Finland is not a fixed fraction of past 
earnings, but it follows a piecewise linear scheme. This allows us to use RKD, in which 
the identification of the effect is based on a pre-determined, nonlinear policy rule 
(Nielsen et al. 2010; Card et al. 2012).2 
 
Previous research has used policy reforms that provide exogenous variation in the 
replacement rates to examine the effect of sick pay level on absence. Several studies 
exploit legislative changes in the replacement rates and provide difference-in-difference 
estimates for Sweden (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Johansson and Palme, 2005; 
Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie, 2013). There is also similar evidence for 
other countries (Puhani and Sonderhof, 2010; De Paola et al. 2014; Ziebarth and 
Karlsson, 2014; Fevang et al. 2014). Most other countries, including the U.S., have more 
fragmented sickness insurance schemes which complicate the analysis (cf. Gruber, 2000). 
In addition to studies that have exploited policy reforms within countries, there is cross-
country evidence on the positive effect of the replacement rate of sickness insurance on 
absenteeism (Frick and Malo, 2008).  
 
The elasticity of absence with respect to the replacement rate is positive, based on earlier 
research. However, the quantitative size of the effect varies substantially from study to 
study. Also, the comparison of the estimates is not straightforward, since the outcome 
                                               
2 See Table 1 in Ganong and Jäger (2014) for a list of RKD applications. 
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variables (duration of sickness absence or number of sickness absence days) are not 
identical in all studies.3  
 
Empirical studies based on policy reforms suffer from a number of caveats. Reforms are 
aimed at specific groups, the causal impact takes time to take effect, agents anticipate the 
upcoming reform,4 effects are confounded by simultaneous policy changes or other 
shocks, etc. Thus, the causal interpretation for the difference-in-difference estimates 
based on policy reforms is not straightforward (cf. Besley and Case, 2000; Pettersson-
Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie, 2013, p. 487).  
 
We improve upon previous literature by using a method that allows us to focus on all 
employees around the kink point in the benefit rule. The kink point provides policy-
relevant exogenous variation in the neighborhood of the median income. A long-standing 
quasi-experiment is likely to reveal equilibrium behavior. We interpret our estimate as 
the Frisch elasticity. We recast the search models by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) of 
optimal unemployment insurance to interpret our results. The models compare universal 
sickness insurance to self-insurance. 
 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical aspects of an optimal 
mandatory sickness insurance system. Section 3 provides an overview of the Finnish 
sickness insurance system. Section 4 describes RKD. Section 5 introduces the data and 
the estimation results are presented in Section 6. The last section concludes.  
 
                                               
3 Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014, p. 209-210) summarize the existing estimates by noting that the elasticity of 
sick days with respect to the benefit level is ~0.9. 
4 De Paola et al. (2014, p. 349) highlight the fact that employees can adjust their sickness absence behavior 
in anticipation of the reform. 
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2. Optimal sickness insurance system 
 
In the absence of private insurance, social planner faces a trade-off: an optimal social 
insurance system balances the costs of more generous payments to the sick with the 
welfare gain resulting from the consumption smoothing that the benefits allow (Baily, 
1978; Chetty, 2006; Chetty and Saez, 2010). A critical input in defining the optimal 
replacement rate in a mandatory sickness insurance program is the elasticity of absence 
w.r.t. the generosity of benefits. The elasticity captures the relevant costs of a higher 
benefit level. 
 
The search model of optimal unemployment insurance benefit compares unemployment 
insurance scheme which is financed by a budget-balancing tax while working to self-
insurance using prior assets as a buffer-stock.5 The unobserved cost of effort of an early 
return to work induces moral hazard to the model.6 
 
In comparative statics it is important to separate effects that refer to shifts in a life-cycle 
wage profile (wealth effects) and movements along a given wage profile. The labor 
supply response to wage changes is generally a mixture of an intertemporal substitution 
effects, compensated wage elasticity and wealth effects. The intertemporal (i.e. Frisch) 
elasticities hold the marginal utility of wealth constant and compensated elasticities hold 
lifetime utility constant. Intertemporal responses are greater than compensated responses 
and they reduce to the same value only if income or wealth effects are zero (Macurdy, 
1981, pp. 1070-1073).  
                                               
5 A mandatory insurance system prevents adverse selection out of insurance coverage. However, in the 
presence of heterogeneity, some workers have more to gain from insurance than others. We leave any 
heterogeneity effects out of the analysis. 
6 The unobserved cost of job search in the unemployment insurance model is reinterpreted in our setting as 
the cost of effort to an early return to work while on sick leave. 
 5
The MaCurdy (1981) critique maintains that studying a reform which changes the whole 
net-of-tax wage profile does not recover the Frisch elasticity, since the reforms affect 
wealth. In our setting, workers return to work with the same wage level as before the 
sickness leave. This is dictated by the Finnish labor law. In Baily’s (1978, p. 389) 
analysis this is a simplifying assumption, but strictly holds in our application. In addition, 
the wealth effect on life-cycle labor supply is likely to be smaller in sickness insurance, 
since the spells of sickness leave (in our data the mean spell is 44 days) are considerably 
shorter than typical unemployment durations (over 15 weeks). Therefore, we ignore the 
wealth effects7 and base the interpretation of the estimates on the simplified two-period 
search models by Baily (1978, pp. 383-390) and Chetty (2006, pp. 1882-1886).  
 
The optimal benefit level of a social insurance system equates the marginal cost of 
financing the benefit to the marginal welfare gain from consumption while on sick leave. 
As a second order Taylor approximation, the optimal benefit condition is a function of 
four parameters (Chetty, 2006, p. 1883): 
 
 
ܧ௕
௦ = ܷԢ(ܥ௦)െܷԢ(ܥ௪)
ܷԢ(ܥ௪) ൎ ߛ οܥܥ௪ (ܾכ) ൤1 + 12ߩ οܥܥ௪ (ܾכ)൨,          (1) 
 
where subscript w stands for being at work, ܾכ is the optimal benefit level, D signifies the 
duration of sickness leave , οܥ/ܥ௪ is the proportional drop in consumption while on sick 
leave, ߛ ൌ െ ௨
ᇲᇲ(஼ೢ)
௨ᇲ(஼ೢ)  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ߩ ൌ െ ௨ᇲᇲᇲ(஼ೢ)௨ᇲᇲ(஼ೢ)  is the 
coefficient of relative prudence and ܧ௕௦ = ௗ ୪୭୥(஽)ௗ ୪୭୥(௕) is the elasticity of the duration of sick 
leave with respect to the sickness benefit. 
                                               
7 This assumption predicts that post sickness leave consumption is, in a stationary environment, equal to 
that before sickness leave. 
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In the absence of a private sickness insurance market and lifetime wealth effects, agents’ 
optimization allows us to assume that sickness benefits are spent solely on consumption 
while sick and that higher taxes are financed solely by reducing consumption while at 
work when computing welfare changes. The welfare change can be written in terms of 
marginal utilities of consumption in the two states, eliminating all other behavioral 
responses when setting the optimal benefit level except for the elasticity parameter (ܧ௕௦) 
that enters the government budget constraint directly.  
 
The reduced-form formula is quite robust (e.g. search costs and the value of leisure show 
up in the optimized level of consumption while sick) and the optimality condition 
captures a basic intuition that carries over to the general case (see Chetty, 2006). We 
exploit a kink in the policy rule to estimate the elasticity. 
 
3. The Finnish sickness insurance system 
 
Finland has a universal mandatory sickness insurance scheme that covers all (16-67 years 
old) permanent residents.8 The scheme guarantees compensation for the loss of earnings 
owing to sickness and illness. Sickness allowances and reimbursements are defined in the 
Health Insurance Act and Decree. Sickness insurance is financed by both employers and 
employees. Insurance contributions are proportional to income and unrelated to the 
benefit rule. The state participates by financing the minimum allowance that is paid to 
those with no earnings.9 
                                               
8 The description of the system is based mainly on Toivonen (2012). Kangas et al. (2013) provide a 
historical account.  
9 Finland has the highest share of sickness absenteeism in Europe (Gimeno et al. 2004). Sickness absence 
has also increased significantly during the past 15 years. The average number of sickness absence days per 
wage and salary earner was 10 in 2008, according to the Quality of Work Life Survey (Lehto and Sutela, 
2009). 
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The Social Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA) pays out a Sickness Allowance (SA) 
as compensation for the loss of earnings caused by an illness or injury. The SA includes 
two provisions: a minimum sickness benefit and an earnings-related benefit. The 
earnings-related benefit is relevant for most of employed and self-employed persons. 
 
Before receiving the SA from KELA, the person must complete a waiting period. It 
includes the day of onset of work incapacity and the following nine working days.10 The 
incapacity for work must be certified by a doctor. The employee is entitled to normal 
salary during the nine-day waiting period if the employment relationship has lasted at 
least a month.11  
 
After the nine-day waiting period the employee is eligible to receive an earnings-related 
SA from KELA. The maximum period for SA is 300 working days (i.e. approximately a 
full calendar year). All SA days within the last two years are counted towards this sum. 
After the maximum has been reached, there is an assessment of eligibility for a disability 
pension. The person is eligible to receive the SA again only after having worked for at 
least a year. 
 
The earnings-related SA has no ceiling. This feature distinguishes the Finnish scheme 
from those of the other Nordic countries and most other European sickness insurance 
systems. In 2012, for annual earnings of up to 34,496 euro, the replacement rate was 70% 
after which it decreased to 45% and at 53,072 euro to 30%.  
 
                                               
10 The waiting period includes Saturdays, but not Sundays or public holidays. 
11 The employer pays a full salary for at least the first nine days, depending on the collective labor 
agreement, if the employment has lasted at least a month. If the employment has lasted less than a month, 
the beneficiary receives 50% of the salary. KELA fully compensates employers for these payments.  
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For our purposes, the most important feature of the system is that the replacement rate of 
the earnings-related SA follows a pre-determined, nonlinear policy rule. First, the SA is 
determined by past taxable annual earnings. The relevant earnings are those earned two 
calendar years before the claim for sickness insurance is made. For example, in 2012, the 
SA was calculated on the basis of taxable earnings in 2010.12 Work-related expenses are 
deducted from taxable earnings, and in addition a deduction is made to account for 
pension and unemployment insurance contributions.  
 
The fact that the SA is determined by past earnings is particularly useful for our 
purposes, because applicants are arguably able to manipulate their current earnings. This 
would invalidate the identification of the causal effect using RKD. But this is highly 
unlikely regarding past earnings. Reassuringly, we are also able to check whether there is 
any bunching of the data points towards the kinks in the benefit rule (see Section 6.2). 
 
The second important feature of the system is that the replacement level follows a 
piecewise linear policy rule in past earnings.13 The determination of SA for 2012 is 
illustrated in Figure 1. There are four earnings brackets. The benefit formula for the 
earnings-related SA exhibits one discontinuity and two kink points, which we define as 
the lower and the upper kink point. The lower kink point allows one to use RKD to 
identify the causal effect of the replacement rate. The discontinuity point cannot be 
exploited, since those below the threshold receive no compensation and thus are not in 
our data. 
 
                                               
12 The amount of taxable earnings is based on the decision by the Finnish Tax Administration. An index is 
used to account for the rise in wage and salary earners’ earnings (80 percent weight) and the cost of living 
index (20 percent weight). 
13 These kinks to the system were created in the early 1980s (see Kangas 2013, p. 283). 
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Figure 1 here 
 
4. Regression Kink Design 
 
4.1. Identification 
 
Nielsen et al. (2010) propose a variant of the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
which they call RKD. Their method uses a kink or kinks in a policy rule to identify the 
causal effect of the policy rule on the outcome variable of interest. A valid RKD setting 
requires the explanatory variable (in our case, the replacement level) to be a deterministic 
and known function of an assignment variable (in our case, earnings from two years 
prior). The function also has to have at least one kink point. This means that the function 
has segments where it is (continuous and) differentiable, but in at least one point it is 
non-differentiable having unequal left and right derivatives (Condition 1).  
 
The second condition for a valid RKD setting is that the assignment variable allocates the 
observations to the left and right segments of a kink point in a manner that is as good as 
random (Condition 2). Endogenous bunching of observations near kink points (i.e. 
discontinuities in the derivative of the density function) or nonlinearity of covariates 
would invalidate this smoothness condition (see Card et al. 2012 for these testable 
predictions). Additionally, regularity conditions are needed for a valid RKD. 
 
In our setup, Condition 1 holds, since we know exactly how earnings from two years 
prior determine the replacement level. We also have data on the relevant earnings and the 
replacement level. Also, as Figure 1 shows, the relationship between the assignment 
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variable and the policy variable for the year 2012 is continuous for earnings above 1325 
euro and has kinks at 34,496 and 53,072 euro. Other years in our data reveal a similar 
structure. 
 
The random assignment of observations (Condition 2) is not directly verifiable in 
empirical applications. But it is unlikely that individuals manipulate the benefit level by 
altering their earnings in order to be assigned to another segment of the replacement 
function two years later. We can also ascertain that other benefit rules, such as the 
earnings-related unemployment benefit, do not have kinks or discontinuities at the same 
points as the sickness benefit and thus they do not affect the randomness of the 
assignment. Furthermore, we can test for whether the distribution of the control variables 
is smooth in relation to the kink point. If we find this not to be the case, Condition 2 fails, 
which invalidates the design. This procedure is very similar to what is usually done to 
validate RDD (for a review, see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). 
 
4.2. Formal model 
 
Let Si be sickness days in the year t, for individual iא{1,2,…,n}, Yi is earnings in the year 
t-2 and Bi is the sickness allowance, which follows the deterministic assignment function 
ܤ௜ = ܾ( ௜ܻ) with a kink at ௜ܻ = ݕ௞ .The parameter of interest is the change in the slope of 
the conditional expectation function ݉(ݕ) = ܧ[ ௜ܵ| ௜ܻ = ݕ], at ݕ௞  divided by the change 
in the slope of the deterministic assignment function ܾ(ݕ) at ݕ = ݕ௞ . The general model 
of interest is of the form: 
௜ܵ = ݏ( ௜ܻ ,ܤ௜ , ߝ௜), 
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where ߝ௜ is an error term.
14 
 
Card et al. (2012) show that ߬, the average marginal effect of ܾ(ݕ), is identified at 
ݕ = ݕ௞  if ݏ( ௜ܻ,ܤ௜, ߝ௜) and its derivatives with respect to ௜ܻ and ܤ௜ are continuous, 
ݏ( ௜ܻ,ܤ௜, ߝ௜) has a kink (Condition 1) and the density of ௜ܻ is smooth (Condition 2) at ݕ௞ . 
Under these assumptions, ܧ(ߝ௜| ௜ܻ = ݕ௞) is a smooth function and 
 
߬ = ܦା݉(ݕ௞) െܦି݉(ݕ௞)
ܦାܾ(ݕ௞) െܦିܾ(ݕ௞) ,  (2) 
where ܦ௝݉(ݕ௞) = lim
௬՜௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௠(௬)
డ௬
,ܦ௝ܾ(ݕ௞) = lim
௬՜௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௕(௬)
డ௬
, ݆ א{+,-}. ߬ is the weighted average 
of marginal effects across the population. The weight is the relative likelihood that an 
individual has ௜ܻ = ݕ௞ , given ߝ௜ (see Card et al. 2012, pp. 8–9 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
 
The numerator in equation (2) is estimated semi-parametrically as ߚଵ using the following 
local power series expansion: 
 
ܧ( ௜ܵ| ௜ܻ = ݕ) ൎ ߙ଴ +෍[ߙ௣(ݕ െ ݕ௞)௣ + ߚ௣ܦ௜(ݕ െ ݕ௞)௣]௉
௣ୀଵ
,  (3) 
where P is the chosen polynomial order of the estimated function and ܦ௜ is the treatment 
status, where 1 means treated and 0 means not treated (ܦ௜(ݖ) = 1, ݂݅ݖ > 0,ܦ௜(ݖ) =
0otherwise). The power series is a local approximation of the conditional expectation 
function of ܵ ௜. Note that |ݕ െ ݕ௞ȁ ൑ ݄, where h is the bandwidth chosen for the 
estimation. The denominator in equation (2) is the change of the slope of the 
deterministic ܾ(ݕ) at the kink point. 
 
                                               
14 See Nielsen et al. (2010) for the model in the following additive form: ௜ܵ = ߬ܤ௜ + ݃(ݕ) + ߝ௜, where݃is 
a fixed function. 
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4.3. Fuzzy setting 
 
Card et al. (2012, pp. 10–12) distinguish between sharp and fuzzy RKD. A fuzzy design 
arises when there is a significant difference between the theoretical and observed value of 
the kink in the policy rule. The difference stems from e.g. measurement errors or the fact 
that the kink in the policy rule is affected by some unobserved and observed variables in 
addition to the primary assignment variable. In our setting, a likely source of error is the 
manner in which variables are defined and classified in the original dataset (see Section 5 
and Figure A1).  
 
In a fuzzy RKD, ܤ௜=b( ௜ܻ , ߝ௜஻). Thus, ܤ௜ is now determined by unobserved factors that 
might be correlated with the assignment variable. Additional assumptions are also 
required for identification. Along with some technical assumptions, monotonicity in the 
assignment function must hold (Condition 3). This condition states that the direction of 
the kink is either non-negative or non-positive for the entire population. ܤ௜ and ௜ܻ are 
allowed to have specific types of measurement error.  
 
When Conditions 1, 2 and 3 and the necessary technical conditions hold,  
 
߬ = ܦା݉(ݕ௞) െܦି݉(ݕ௞)
ܦାܾ(ݕ௞) െܦିܾ(ݕ௞) ,  (4) 
where ܦ௝݉(ݕ௞) = lim
௬՜௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௠(௬)
డ௬
,ܦ௝ܾ(ݕ௞) = lim
௬՜௬ೖ
ೕ
డா[஻೔|௒೔ୀ௬]
డ௬
, ݆ א{+,-}.߬, the average 
marginal effect of ܾ(ݕ) at ݕ = ݕ௞ , in equation (4) is weighted by the product of three 
components (see Card et al. 2012, p. 12). As in a sharp RKD, the first component is the 
relative probability of ௜ܻ = ݕ௞ . The second is the size of the kink in the benefit rule for 
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individual i. The third component is the probability that the assignment variable is 
correctly measured at ௜ܻ = ݕ௞ . 
 
For estimation of the expected change of the policy rule, we use the following local 
power series expansion:  
 
ܧ(ܤ௜| ௜ܻ = ݕ) ൎ ߜ଴ +෍[ߜ௣(ݕ െ ݕ௞)௣ + ߛ௣ܦ௜(ݕ െ ݕ௞)௣]௉
௣ୀଵ
,   
where ɀଵ is the empirical counterpart of the policy rule. The elasticity of interest can be 
approximated as ߬ ൎ
ఉభ
ఊభ
. To obtain the correct point estimate and standard errors for ɒ, 
we use instrumental variable (IV) regression, following Card et al. (2012, pp. 20–21). 
The instrument is the interaction term of past earnings and an indicator of earnings above 
the lower kink point, ܦ௜(ݕ െ ݕ௞). The instrumented variable is ܤ௜, the received 
compensation. 
 
4.4. Bandwidth selector 
 
The bandwidth selection is a trade-off between bias and precision. Card et al. (2012, pp. 
32–33) use the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth selector of Fan and Gijbels (1996, equation 
3.20, p. 67; henceforth FG): 
݄ = ܥ௣ ቊ ߪොଶ(0)[ ෝ݉ (௣ାଵ)(0)]ଶ መ݂(0)ቋ ଵଶ௣ାଷ ݊ି ଵଶ௣ାଷ , 
where p is the order of the polynomial in the main specification, ߪොଶ(0) and ෝ݉ (௣ାଵ)(0) 
are, respectively, the estimated error variance and (p+1)th order derivative of the 
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regression, using a wide-bandwidth polynomial regression of equation (3),15 C1 is 2.352 
for the boundary case with a uniform kernel and መ݂(0) is estimated from a global 
polynomial fit to the histogram of earnings. Bandwidth choices which are too “large” 
lead to a non-negligible bias in the estimator of the conditional expectation function. We 
report the results for multiple bandwidths in the sensitivity analysis and we also use a 
bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014; henceforth CCT). Calonico et al. 
(2014) build the CCT bandwidth selector upon the FG bandwidth selector. 
 
5. Data 
 
We use total data on Finnish sickness absence spells over the period 2004–2012. This 
comprehensive register-based data originate from KELA and they are derived from the 
database that is used to pay out the SA compensations. Therefore, some measurement 
error might arise from the aggregation of variables when converting the original register 
for research purposes.16 The administrative data cover both wage and salary earners and 
self-employed persons. The data record the start and end dates for all sickness spells and 
the total amount of SA paid for each person. Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices 
by using the consumer price index. 
 
Our data consist of absence spells that last for longer than the waiting period of nine full 
working days. The distribution is right-skewed.17 Thus, longer sickness absences 
                                               
15 We use the data for a very wide window of 0.8 log earnings for this regression, which contains 85% of 
the total sample. This is done in order to keep the polynomial order within reasonable limits. The 
polynomial order is chosen to minimize Akaike Information Criterion. Also, the polynomial in this context 
is allowed to be nonlinear up to the pth order. This is necessary in order for ෝ݉(݌+1)(0) to exist.  
16 In particular, consecutive absence spells that start within 300 days are counted as a single spell if the 
diagnosis remains the same. 
17 The skewness of the distribution is 2.5 and 2.9 for the total sample and for the window of 0.0796 log 
earnings around the lower kink point, respectively. 
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contribute disproportionately to the total days lost and absence costs. The data enable us 
to concentrate on those absences that are affected by the incentives of the sickness 
insurance system. 
 
The data record a person’s past taxable earnings that KELA obtains directly from the 
Finnish tax authorities. KELA uses the same information to calculate the SA for 
beneficiaries. The data also include useful background information such as a medical 
diagnosis for the reason for sick leave, which can be used to test for validity of the RKD. 
The initial diagnosis of individuals is documented according to the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10).18 We have also linked to the data the highest 
completed education from the Register of Completed Education and Degrees, maintained 
by Statistics Finland. 
 
The estimations are restricted to those in the labor force who are eligible for sick pay and 
who are between 16 and 70 years of age. The final sample used in the analysis includes 
compensated absence spells which are above zero in duration and whose payment criteria 
and initial diagnoses are known for employees with a single employer during their 
sickness spell.19 The final sample around the lower kink point consists of 37,000–41,000 
individuals, depending on the year. Descriptive statistics is reported in Table 1 (duration 
of sickness absence and background characteristics for persons).20 
                                               
18 ICD is the standard diagnostic tool for clinical purposes. The classification is available at: 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
19 A part-time sickness benefit was introduced in Finland at the beginning of 2007. We exclude its 
recipients from the sample. Only 0.5% of the sample has no known diagnosis. Also, 146 observations with 
missing received compensation were excluded. We are able to identify entrepreneurs from 2006 onwards. 
We exclude the 2.3% of the original sample that entrepreneurs represent. In total, we exclude c. 3.0% of 
the original data to construct the final sample. 
20 A fraction of the insured (13.6%) are compensated according to an eligibility criterion other than prior 
earnings (e.g. if earnings have changed by more than 20%, the compensation can be claimed based on 
more recent earnings, see Toivonen 2012). Our results are robust to their exclusion from the sample (see 
Table A3). 
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Table 1 here 
 
Figure 2 reveals that persons with low earnings have a longer duration of sickness 
absence. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that poor health erodes earning 
capacity (cf. Aittomäki et al. 2014, p. 86), assuming that the duration of sickness absence 
is a valid proxy for health. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
We exploit the lower kink point to identify and estimate the effect of the replacement rule 
for two reasons. First, the lower kink point is located in the part of the earnings 
distribution which contains substantial mass to support the estimation of statistically 
significant effects (Figure A2). The large sample size around this kink point shows as 
smaller variability in the length of sickness absence within the 800 euro bins. Second, 
there is a large change in the benefit rule at the lower kink point (cf. Figure 1).21  
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Baseline estimates 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the duration of sickness absence and annual earnings around the lower 
kink point.22 It suggests that there is a behavioral response at the kink.  
                                               
21 The estimated effects are insignificant at the upper kink point and thus omitted. There are multiple 
reasons for the insignificance of the estimate: fewer data points, smaller slope change and potentially 
heterogeneous treatment effects. The point estimate for the upper kink estimate is 0.426 (1.677). FG 
bandwidth is 0.086.  
22 The bandwidth in Figure 3 was chosen for illustrative purposes to mitigate excessive noise, following the 
methodological guidance of Lee and Lemieux (2010). The number of bins used coincides with the number 
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Using the FG bandwidth of 0.0796 log euro for annual earnings, we find clear evidence 
for the incentive effects (see Table 2 and Table A1). The estimated change of the slope at 
the lower kink point is -0.56. The weighted average of the marginal elasticities of the 
duration of sickness absence (߬) with respect to the replacement rate is 1.41 [95% CI: 
0.36, 2.46] using the linear specification. The point estimate implies a high elasticity. The 
quadratic specification (i.e. when ݌ = 2) gives a point estimate of 0.83 [0.27, 1.38] with 
the FG bandwidth of 0.2953 also implying a significant behavioral response. Using the 
CCT23 (Calonico et al. 2014) bias-corrected estimator and bandwidth (0.1416), we 
estimate the elasticity to be 1.16. The CCT was estimated using the triangular kernel.24  
 
Figure 3 and Table 2 here 
 
The wider the bandwidth used, the lower the point estimates get. This result is illustrated 
in Figure 4. If functions ܧ( ௜ܵ| ௜ܻ = ݕ) and ܧ(ܤ௜| ௜ܻ = ݕ) are piecewise linear and the 
sample size is sufficiently large, then the point estimate would remain unchanged with all 
bandwidths, i.e. the relationship depicted in Figure 4 would be a horizontal line. Thus, 
deviations from the horizontal line are indicative of curvature in the conditional 
expectation functions and consequently the presence of bias in the local linear estimator. 
 
Figure 4 here 
                                                                                                                                           
given by Sturges’ rule (Sturges, 1926), which is a classic method for choosing the optimal number of bins 
for histograms. See Figure A3 for the same graph without the fit and confidence interval, but illustrating 
the sample size around the kink point. Figures A4 and A5 report the annual graphs. 
23 The CCT estimator is singularly compute-intensive in our setting.  
24 The FG bandwidth depends on the polynomial order. Under the same bandwidth sequence, the variance 
of the local quadratic estimator with a uniform kernel is 16 times as large as its local linear counterpart (see 
Card et al. 2012, pp. 15–16). Thus, we focus mainly on the linear specification. Asymptotically a local 
quadratic regression using its optimal bandwidth sequence is preferred to the local linear regression with its 
optimal bandwidth sequence. The asymptotic advantage, however, does not provide finite sample 
guarantees. We also report the results from the quadratic specification in Table 2. Following the 
recommendation of Gelman and Imbens (2014) for RDD, we omit reporting results with higher order 
polynomials. 
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The choice of bandwidth is a compromise between precision and bias. The main 
specification uses the FG bandwidth h, estimated to be 0.0796 log euro, which fulfils two 
criteria. First, covariates are linear, whereas they show nonlinearity at wider bandwidths 
(see Table A2) than 0.0796 log euro. Second, estimates are sufficiently precise, whereas 
a narrower band would increase standard errors.  
 
Precision in regression analysis increases with sample size and variance in the 
explanatory variable. Both of these decrease as the bandwidth narrows. Note that the FG 
bandwidth that we use in our main specification is quite narrow in terms of monthly 
earnings (~460 euro in 2012).  
 
6.2. Sensitivity analyses 
 
We confirm the result from the main specification using different sets of controls (see 
Table 3). The results show a reassuring degree of robustness. Controlling for individual 
characteristics and the initial diagnosis at the one-letter level (21 different values) gives 
the same point estimate as the regression with no controls. The adjusted R2 of the model 
increases from 0.0003 to 0.0781 once all the controls are included. 
  
Table 3 here 
 
We also run the main estimates by subsample to detect possible heterogeneity in the 
effect (see Table A3 and Figure A6). We show the results for subsamples according to 
sex, left censoring of sickness spells at 20 days, and most importantly by SA criterion 
and keeping only observations where the data year matches with the starting year of 
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sickness. When subsampled by diagnosis, sample sizes drop dramatically and all relevant 
estimates are insignificant (not reported). The heterogeneity of behavior by sex or other 
attributes is of no practical interest unless the policy parameters (i.e. the benefit and 
contribution rules) are conditioned on these variables. 
 
To detect whether there might be any bias induced by possible non-randomness in the 
assignment, it is necessary to check for the linearity of covariates at the kink point. The 
covariates are all linear, with the exception of the female indicator and the indicator for 
tertiary education (Table A2, Figures A7 and A8). However, we run 101 placebo 
regressions, where the lower kink point is assumed to be off the correct location by -0.5 
to 0.5 of log earnings at intervals of 0.01 log earnings and find nonlinearities in 56% and 
49% of the specifications for the female indicator and the indicator for tertiary education, 
respectively (see Figures A9 and A10). This is encouraging, since the nonlinearity of 
these two variables at the lower kink point appears to be spurious, and the nonlinearities 
found reflect the location of females and higher educated in the earnings distribution, 
unrelated to the benefit rule.  
 
The fact that the three most common one-letter level diagnoses are linear is particularly 
important, since the diagnoses are closely linked to the duration of sickness absence. This 
is evident in the R2 of the estimated regressions with and without diagnoses (Table 3).  
 
We test and find no evidence of non-smoothness in the density function of log earnings 
around the lower kink point (see Figures A11 and A12).25 Neither is non-smoothness 
                                               
25 We use “non-smoothness” and “bunching” interchangeably. Smoothness implies no jump in the density 
or a kink in the density. 
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found if the densities for males or females are considered separately (not reported).26 We 
conclude that the nonlinearity of the female indicator at the kink point is of minor 
concern for a causal interpretation of our response estimate. 
 
To test robustness of our main specification in Table 2, we run 101 placebo regressions 
(see Figure 5).27 We use the same FG bandwidth of the true (lower) kink point for all 
these regressions. Of the 94 regressions not around the true kink point, ~7 (7.4%) show a 
significant estimated effect. This lends strong support to the claim that the result is not 
spurious.  
 
Figure 5 here 
 
6.3. Economic interpretation 
 
The response is affected in part by employer incentives (see Footnote 11 for details of the 
payment structure). Using the duration of the benefit period paid out to the employer (as 
opposed to the whole period, which consists periods of payments to the employer and 
employee) as the response variable, the estimated response is well within the confidence 
interval of our main specification. This suggests that employer incentives are aligned 
with those of the employees.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, the response parameter ܧ௕௦ on the left-hand side of equation 
(1) is the elasticity of the duration of sick leave (D) with respect to the level of sickness 
                                               
26 See Appendix 2 for a decomposition of the density function by sex. 
27 Ganong and Jäger (2014) propose that researchers using RKD should present a distribution of placebo 
estimates in regions without a policy kink. 
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benefit (B=by). In the model, the sickness benefit is financed by contributions which are 
proportional to earnings, T=ty. Substituting rates for levels in the derivation of equation 
(1) has no effect on the government budget constraint nor any first-order effects on the 
optimal conditions and therefore the equation (1) is left unchanged (see, Chetty, 2006, p. 
1884).28  
 
In the Finnish nonlinear benefit rule, those in the higher earnings bracket receive both a 
lower marginal replacement rate and a fixed benefit unrelated to earnings and created by 
the nonlinear benefit rule (segment AB in Figure 6). In calculating the cost effects of 
reforming the mandatory sickness insurance using our elasticity estimate we assume that 
the benefit is proportionally adjusted in our policy simulation. To accomplish this we 
modify all benefit rates accordingly, unchanging the locations of the kinks and therefore 
proportionally adjusting also the fixed benefits (for details, see Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
The impact of a proportional 5% increase in the benefit level for the year 2012 is a 0.06% 
[0.02%, 0.11%] reduction in GDP (cf. Figure 6). For this back-of-envelope calculation, 
we approximate productivity per working day by dividing annual earnings (in 2010) by 
300 and adding 60% to account for indirect labor costs. The crucial (and strong) 
assumption is that the estimated elasticity is constant at 1.41 [0.36, 2.46]29 throughout the 
                                               
28 E.g. consider the elasticity: ܧ௕௦ = ௗ஽ௗ஻ ஻஽ = ௗ஽ௗ(௕௬) ௗ(௕௬)ௗ௕ ௕஽ = ௗ஽ௗ௕ ௕஽. 
29 This estimate is based on the FG bandwidth. This is of course a local estimate for individuals at the kink 
and might differ from the average response for the whole population in the presence of heterogeneity. 
Specifically, our estimate corresponds to an average response weighted by the ex ante probability of being 
at the kink given the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. 
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distributions of earnings, sickness benefits and sickness absence duration. We also 
assume that an increase of 5% is small enough for the constancy of the elasticity.30 
 
We calculate the optimal replacement rate using equation (1) and assuming a Constant 
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function (see Figure 7). Using elasticities of 
absence w.r.t. the benefit level of 1.41 and 0.83, we find that the replacement rate of the 
lowest bracket in the Finnish system (0.7) is optimal when the Coefficient of Relative 
Risk Aversion (CoRRA) is 2.95 and 1.92, respectively, implying that the optimal 
coefficient of relative prudence is 3.95 and 2.92 (see notes to Figure 7). Assuming a 
constant elasticity throughout the earnings distribution, the highest possible replacement 
rate of 0.25 is optimal only if CoRRA is low at around 1 (see Figure A13 for replacement 
rates at different earnings levels).  
 
With respect to small, temporary shocks such as non-disabling illness, the CoRRA may 
be much greater than w.r.t. large shocks such as disability. This difference stems from 
rigidities such as consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl, 2006). CoRRA may 
also vary with earnings level. 
 
Figure 7 here 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 In calculating the effects of reforming the mandatory sickness insurance by reducing the number of 
benefit brackets (or extending the result to a linear benefit system with zero fixed benefit), one should in 
principle take into account liquidity effects that operate through changes in non-zero fixed benefit created 
by the nonlinear benefit rule (see Chetty, 2008 and Landais, 2014). 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Using administrative data on absence spells with a large sample size, we find a 
considerable incentive effect of the sickness benefit rule at the intensive margin in a 
quasi-experimental research setting. The point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of 
sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate is on the order of 1.  
A large number of observations guarantee the robustness of our results even controlling 
for sickness diagnoses. Exogeneity is ensured by the fact that the sickness benefit is 
determined by earnings two years prior. An extensive battery of checks was run on a 
number of variables which might influence our results at the kink point.  
 
Our contribution is to exploit a research design that delivers a compelling estimate with 
strong internal validity on a vital policy parameter in a social insurance system. Since the 
estimates are obtained at the earnings level close to the median earnings (within 1% in 
2012), the response is likely to be similar for a large proportion of the population (see 
Figure A2). Previous literature has analyzed reforms, which are usually targeted at a 
specific subset of the population. The behavioral responses of the subset of the 
population might differ from that of the total population, which impairs the external 
validity of these research findings.  
 
Our research provides a pioneering application of the regression kink design. The 
research design builds on exogenous variation that can be exploited for coherent causal 
inference in a manner that the regression discontinuity design rarely offers, since in our 
case the eligible persons have significantly weaker incentives to optimize their behavior 
with respect to the policy rule. However, to obtain statistically significant results, one has 
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to ensure sufficient sample sizes, since the changes in the policy rule and the responses 
tend to be noisy and are affected by sample heterogeneity. 
 
The result we find might prove to be crucial for policy makers who aim to improve the 
cost effectiveness of the mandatory sickness insurance. Although the behavioral effect is 
only observed around the kink point, one would expect the benefit system to have strong 
behavioral effects elsewhere along the benefit rule as well. Future research should 
consider response at the extensive margin. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between prior annual earnings and daily sickness allowance in 
euro. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the discontinuity point at 1325 euro and the lower and upper 
kink points at 34,496 and 53,072 euro in 2012. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 Panel A: Total sample Panel B: Sample around 
the lower kink point 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Duration of sickness absence (days) 43.76 70.73 1 575 36.36 60.94 1 454 
Duration of sickness absence (log-days) 2.76 1.47 0 6 2.62 1.42 0 6.12 
Earnings 26364.68 16119.64 0 6120738 33120.44 1923.67 29095 37897 
Log earnings 10.07 0.67 -3.00 15.63 10.41 0.06 10.28 10.54 
Age 45.13 11.35 16 70 46.53 10.01 17 69 
Female 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Tertiary level education  0.14 0.34 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Sickness allowance per day (euro) 54.3 23.19 0.01 4600.56 69.16 8.26 0.02 136.21 
Panel C: Sample size by year 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Total sample 344,590 352,446 346,747 341,527 339,949 317,618 309,893 309,333 313,101 2,975,204 
Sample around 
the lower kink 
point 
39,887 41,275 41,380 40,617 40,693 38,368 37,875 37,068 37,652 354,815 
 
Note: The sample around the lower kink point is defined within the FG bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of 
annual earnings). The diagnoses M, S and F represent respectively 34, 13 and 16 percent of the whole 
sample and 36, 14 and 14 percent of the sample around the lower kink point. Diagnosis M in ICD-10 refers 
to diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue. Diagnosis S refers to injury, poisoning and 
certain other consequences of external causes. Diagnosis F refers to mental and behavioral disorders.  
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Figure 2. Duration of sickness absence in 2012 and annual earnings. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the discontinuity point at 1325 euro and the kink points at 
34,496 and 53,072 euro in 2012. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness absence in bins of 800 
euro. One bin between each discontinuity and the kink point has been extended such that the discontinuity 
and the kink points are located at the bin cut-off points. 
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Figure 3. Duration of sickness absence (2004–2012) and annual earnings (two years 
prior) around the lower kink point. 
 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are in 
logs and normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness 
absence in bins of 0.018 log euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG 
bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the 
analysis (cf. Table 2). 
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Table 2. Regression estimates. 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: log duration of sickness absence (days) 
 Linear specification 
 
Quadratic 
specification 
 
Linear specification, 
bias-corrected (CCT) 
Bandwidth FG bandwidth FG bandwidth CCT Bandwidth 
Kernel Uniform Uniform Triangular 
Change of slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.556*** 
(0.208) 
-0.353*** 
(0.119) 
.. 
Slope below kink point 
(ߙଵ) 
0.240** 
(0.112) 
0.162*** 
(0.06) 
.. 
Yearly fixed effects Y Y N 
Polynomial order 1 2 1 (bias correction: 2) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0003 0.0002 .. 
N 354,800 1,326,992 635,548 
 Panel B: Elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to 
replacement rate 
Change in the replacement 
rate  (ߛଵ)  -0.394*** (0.021) -0.318*** (0.086) -0.393*** (0.012) 
Elasticity (߬ ൎ ఉభ
ఊభ
) 
1.411 
 
 
0.830 
 
.. 
 Panel C: Instrumental variable estimation of the elasticity of the 
duration of sickness absence with respect to replacement rate 
Estimated elasticity (߬) 1.411*** 
(0.536)  
0.830*** 
(0.283) 
1.155***  
(0.359) 
N 354,800 1,326,992 566,392 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The main specification is marked in light grey. The estimated model is 
equation (3). The FG bandwidth referring to the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth described in Fan and Gijbels 
(1996) is estimated to be 0.0796 and 0.2953 for the linear and quadratic specification, respectively. The 
95% confidence interval for the IV estimated elasticity with a point estimate of 1.41 is [0.36, 2.46], using 
the linear specification. CCT refers to the bandwidth (0.1416) and bias-corrected estimator proposed by 
Calonico et al. (2014). The 95% confidence interval for the IV estimated elasticity with a point estimate of 
1.16 is [0.45, 1.86], using the linear CCT specification. The instrument is the interaction term of past 
earnings and an indicator of earnings above the lower kink point. The Angrist–Pischke first-stage F-
statistic (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, pp. 217–218) for a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
instrument is zero in a regression of the received compensation on the instrument is higher (346) in the 
linear FG specification than the conventional threshold of 10 for a weak instrument. Clustering standard 
errors at the level of the individual increases the 95% CI only marginally (1.67%). In the main 
specification, the standard error with clustering is 0.545. 
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Figure 4. Regression estimates with different bandwidths. 
 
 
Notes: The graph represents 33 estimates of the elasticity (Ĳ) using the main specification (log sickness 
absence duration on log earnings with yearly fixed effects), between bandwidths of 0.0396 and 0.1996 at 
intervals of 0.05 log earnings. The point estimates are depicted in black and 95% confidence intervals in 
light gray. The FG bandwidth is marked by a short vertical line (cf. notes to Table 2). 
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Table 3. Regression estimates of the main specification with controls. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: log duration of sickness absence (days) 
Change of slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.556*** 
(0.208) 
-0.516** 
(0.206) 
-0.502** 
(0.201) 
-0.473** 
(0.199) 
Slope below kink point 
(ߙଵ) 
0.240** 
(0.112) 
0.055 
(0.111) 
0.208* 
(0.108) 
0.034 
(0.107) 
Yearly fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Individual 
characteristics 
 Y  Y 
Initial diagnosis (at 
one-letter level) 
  Y Y 
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0003 0.0134 0.0661 0.0781 
N 354,800 354,800 354,800 354,800 
Panel B: Instrumental variable estimation of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to 
replacement rate 
Estimated elasticity (Ĳ) 1.411*** 
(0.536) 
1.314** 
(0.533) 
1.274** 
(0.517) 
1.206** 
(0.516) 
N 354,800 354,800 354,800 354,800 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimated model is equation (3). Individual characteristics are age, 
sex, the Helsinki Metropolitan Area indicator and tertiary education indicator. Initial diagnosis is denoted 
at the one-letter level, following the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10). The data have 21 different values for this variable. The FG bandwidth 
referring to the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth described in Fan and Gijbels (1996) is estimated to be 0.0796. 
The instrument is the interaction term of past earnings and an indicator of earnings above the lower kink 
point. The lowest Angrist–Pischke first-stage F-statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of 
the instrument is zero in a regression of the received compensation on the instrument is 344 in the second 
column regression with individual characteristics as the control variables (cf. notes in Table 2). 
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Figure 5. Placebo regressions. 
 
 
Notes: The graph represents 101 estimates of the kink using the main specification (log sickness absence 
duration on log earnings with yearly fixed effects), where the lower kink point is assumed to be off the 
correct location by -0.5 to 0.5 of log earnings at intervals of 0.01 log earnings. The lower kink point is 
originally normalized to be at 0 of log earnings. The point estimates are depicted in black and 95% 
confidence intervals in light gray. Of the 94 regressions not around the kink point, 7.4% are significant at 
the 5% level.  
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Figure 6. A policy reform. 
 
 
Notes: ܾ (ݕ) is the benefit rule. ߤ = 1.05.  
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Figure 7. Optimal consumption replacement rate. 
 
 
Notes: ܧ௕௦ is the elasticity of sickness absence w.r.t. the benefit level. The elasticities used in the calculation 
are taken from the linear and quadratic FG specifications as presented in Table 2 (columns 1 and 2). The 
optimal replacement rate is ͳ െ ο஼
஼ೢ
 and calculated based on equation (1). The horizontal lines at 0.7 and 
0.25 represent the highest and lowest marginal replacement rates in the Finnish sickness insurance system, 
respectively. The coefficient of relative prudence is assumed to be one plus the Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion (CoRRA). This is the value implied by the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function: ݑ(ܿ) = ൝௖భషംଵିఊ ݂݅ߛ ് 1log ܿ ݂݅ߛ = 1. The range of values of CoRRA are taken from Gruber (1997, p. 203). 
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Appendix 1: Additional figures and tables. 
Figure A1. Annual earnings and compensation level around the lower kink point in 2012. 
 
Notes: Earnings are in logs and normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The large dots represent the 
mean log compensation level in bins of 0.006 log euro. Each small dot represents one observation. The 
vertical axis has been cut at 4.5 for clarity. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for 
the FG bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in 
the analysis. The double line that starts right below the lower kink point stems from the fact that some of 
the benefits in 2012 data follow 2011 replacement rates. This is a source of fuzziness in the data. 
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Figure A2. Kernel density estimates of the earnings distributions. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the discontinuity points at 1,211 and 1,325 euro and the kink 
points at 31,506 and 48,473 euro in dark gray (2002) and 34,496 and 53,072 euro in black (2010). The 
kernel is Gaussian and the bandwidth is set at 675 and 769 euro, respectively. 
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Figure A3. Duration of sickness absence (2004–2012) and annual earnings (two years 
prior) around the lower kink point, with the dot size representing sample size within the 
bin. 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are in 
logs and normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness 
absence in bins of 0.018 log euro. The dot size represents sample size within the bin, from the highest 
(57,341) to the lowest (25,194). 
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Figure A4. Annual earnings and duration of sickness absence around the lower kink point 
2004–2007. 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are also 
normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness absence in 
bins of 0.018 log euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG bandwidth 
(0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the analysis. It 
should be noted that the bandwidth was optimized for the aggregated data 2004–2012. The yearly 
estimates were not significant at the 5 % level for 2004–2007. 
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Figure A5. Annual earnings and duration of sickness absence around the lower kink point 
2008–2012. 
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Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are also 
normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness absence in 
bins of 0.018 log euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG bandwidth 
(0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the analysis. It 
should be noted that the bandwidth was optimized for the aggregated data 2004–2012. The yearly 
estimates were significant at the 5 % level only for the years 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A1. Regression estimates with different bandwidths. 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: log duration of sickness absence (days) 
 Linear specification 
Bandwidth FG bandwidth 
- 0.04 
FG bandwidth 
- 0.02 
FG 
bandwidth 
FG bandwidth 
+ 0.02 
FG bandwidth 
+ 0.04 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.129 
(0.593) 
-0.908*** 
(0.321) 
-0.556*** 
(0.208) 
-0.402*** 
(0.149) 
-0.286*** 
(0.114) 
Slope below 
kink point 
(ߙଵ) 
0.236 
(0.325) 
0.451*** 
(0.174) 
0.240** 
(0.112) 
0.238*** 
(0.079) 
0.149*** 
(0.060) 
Yearly fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Polynomial 
order 
1 1 1 1 1 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
 Panel B: Elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to 
replacement rate 
Change in the 
replacement 
rate  (ߛଵ)  -0.346*** (0.061) -0.377*** (0.033) -0.394*** (0.021) -0.390*** (0.015) -0.402*** (0.012) 
Elasticity 
(߬ ൎ ఉభ
ఊభ
) not sig. 
 
2.409 
 
1.411 
 
1.031 
 
0.712 
 
 Panel C: Instrumental variable estimation of the elasticity of the duration of 
sickness absence with respect to replacement rate 
Estimated 
elasticity (߬) 0.373 (1.72) 2.408*** (0.886) 1.411*** (0.536)  1.033*** (0.386) 0.712** (0.285) 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The main specification is marked in light grey. The estimated model is 
equation (3). The FG bandwidth referring to the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth described in Fan and Gijbels 
(1996) is estimated to be 0.0796 for the linear specification. The 95% confidence interval for the IV 
estimated elasticity with a point estimate of 1.41 is [0.36, 2.46], using the linear specification. The 
instrument is the interaction term of past earnings and an indicator of earnings above the lower kink point 
(cf. Table 2).  
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Table A2. Regression estimates from the main local linear specification, covariates. 
Bandwidth FG bandwidth 
- 0.04 
FG bandwidth 
- 0.02 
FG bandwidth FG bandwidth 
+ 0.02 
FG bandwidth 
+ 0.04 
Diagnose M 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
0.007 
(0.2) 
-0.127 
(0.108) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.021 
(0.05) 
-0.040 
(0.038) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Diagnose S 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.023 
(0.145) 
0.051 
(0.079) 
0.004 
(0.051) 
0.033 
(0.037) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Diagnose F 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.050 
(0.145) 
-0.008 
(0.079) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.009 
(0.036) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Diagnose M, S or F 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.065 
(0.2) 
-0.085 
(0.109) 
0.055 
(0.07) 
0.021 
(0.05) 
-0.057 
(0.039) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Age 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
3.403 
(4.144) 
-2.517 
(2.262) 
0.568 
(1.464) 
2.117** 
(1.046) 
2.667*** 
(0.798) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Female 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
0.437** 
(0.208) 
0.494*** 
(0.113) 
0.312*** 
(0.073) 
0.318*** 
(0.052) 
0.353*** 
(0.04) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0037 0.0057 0.0085 0.0118 0.0152 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Female (quadratic specification) 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.002 
(0.829) 
0.180 
(0.450) 
0.638** 
(0.291) 
0.450** 
(0.207) 
0.316** 
(0.157) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0037 0.0057 0.0085 0.0118 0.0152 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Highest Degree Tertiary Education 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
0.003 
(0.151) 
0.210** 
(0.083) 
0.134** 
(0.054) 
0.131*** 
(0.038) 
0.152*** 
(0.029) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0068 0.0076 0.0080 0.0087 0.0101 
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N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Highest Degree Tertiary Education (quadratic specification) 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.156 
(0.605) 
-0.404 
(0.329) 
0.062 
(0.212) 
0.135 
(0.151) 
0.104 
(0.115) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0068 0.0076 0.0080 0.0087 0.0101 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
Lives in Helsinki Metropolitan Area 
Change of 
slope at kink 
point (ߚଵ) 
-0.083 
(0.164) 
0.0270 
(0.089) 
-0.051 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 
N 176,215 264,944 354,800 444,304 533,718 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimated model is equation (3). Diagnosis M in ICD-10 refers to 
diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue. Diagnosis S refers to injury, poisoning and 
certain other consequences of external causes. Diagnosis F refers to mental and behavioral disorders. The 
FG bandwidth referring to the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth described in Fan and Gijbels (1996) is 
estimated to be 0.0796.  
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Table A3. Regression estimates for different subsamples. 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: log duration of sickness absence (days) 
Subsample Females Males Left censoring 
at 20 days 
SA criterion: 
annual 
earnings year 
t-2 
Observations 
where the data 
year matches 
with the starting 
year of sickness 
Change of slope at 
kink point (ߚଵ) 
-0.110 
(0.293) 
-0.779*** 
(0.294) 
-0.705*** 
(0.177) 
-0.488** 
(0.223) 
-0.501** 
(0.227) 
Slope below kink point 
(ߙଵ) 
0.077 
(0.153) 
0.059 
(0.162) 
0.350*** 
(0.095) 
0.205* 
(0.120) 
0.221* 
(0.122) 
Yearly fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 
ܴଶ (Adj.) 0.0001 0.0011 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
N 170,869 183,931 204,208 306,463 296,907 
 Panel B: Elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to replacement rate 
Change in the 
replacement rate  (ߛଵ)  -0.406*** (0.030) -0.384*** (0.030) -0.386*** (0.032) -0.380*** (0.022) -0.415**  (0.012) 
Elasticity (߬ ൎ ఉభ
ఊభ
) 
0.271 
 
 
2.029 
 
1.826 
 
1.284 
 
1.207 
 Panel C: Instrumental variable estimation of the elasticity of the duration of sickness 
absence with respect to replacement rate 
Estimated elasticity (߬) 0.271 
(0.724) 
2.032*** 
(0.790) 
1.823*** 
(0.491) 
1.286** 
(0.595) 
1.206** 
(0.553) 
N 170,869 183,931 204,208 306,463 296,907 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The bandwidth is the FG bandwidth of the main specification (see Table 2 
for more details).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
Figure A6. Left censoring of duration and the corresponding estimated elasticity. 
 
Notes: The graph represents 51 left censored regressions of the duration of sickness spells at 9 (i.e. the 
main specification in Table 2) to 59 days. Sample size decreases monotonically with censoring, reaching 
62,578 at 59 days. The point estimates are depicted in black and 95% confidence intervals in light gray.  
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Figure A7. Linearity of covariates: initial diagnoses. 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are in 
logs and normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness 
absence in bins of 0.018 log euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG 
bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the 
analysis. Diagnosis M in ICD-10 refers to diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue. 
Diagnosis S refers to injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes. Diagnosis F 
refers to mental and behavioral disorders.  
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Figure A8. Linearity of covariates: age, sex (female indicator), having tertiary education 
and living in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are in 
logs and normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness 
absence in bins of 0.018 log euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG 
bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the 
analysis. 
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Figure A9. Placebo regressions, female indicator. 
 
Notes: The graph represents 101 estimates of the kink using the main specification (log sickness absence 
duration on log earnings), where the lower kink point is assumed to be off the correct location by -0.5 to 
0.5 of log earnings at intervals of 0.01 log earnings. The lower kink point is originally normalized to be at 
0 of log earnings. The point estimates are depicted in black and 95% confidence intervals in light gray. Of 
the 94 regressions not around the kink point, 56% are significant at the 5% level.  
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Figure A10. Placebo regressions, indicator for tertiary education. 
 
Notes: The graph represents 101 estimates of the kink using the main specification (log sickness absence 
duration on log earnings), where the lower kink point is assumed to be off the correct location by -0.5 to 
0.5 of log earnings at intervals of 0.01 log earnings. The lower kink point is originally normalized to be at 
0 of log earnings. The point estimates are depicted in black and 95% confidence intervals in light gray. Of 
the 94 regressions not around the kink point, 49% are significant at the 5% level.  
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Figure A11. McCrary test for discontinuity of density at the lower kink point. 
 
Notes: The McCrary (2008) test for discontinuity of the density function at the kink point shows no 
discontinuity for log earnings of -0.2 to 0.2 around the lower kink point in bins of 0.00024 and bandwidth 
of 0.0659.  
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Figure A12. An adapted McCrary test for discontinuity of the slope of the density at the 
lower kink point. 
 
Notes: A test for a kink (i.e. a discontinuity in the slope) of the density function at the kink point shows no 
discontinuity in the slope, adapting the McCrary test for slopes using bins of 0.00024 and bandwidth of 
0.0659.  
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Figure A13. Replacement rates in 2012. 
 
 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the lower and upper kink points at 34,496 and 53,072 euro in 
2012. The horizontal line represent the highest marginal replacement rate of 0.25. 
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Appendix 2: The density function by sex. 
 
Consider a mixed density by sex ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )m m m ff y p f y p f y   , and probability 
 ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )m m m m m m fP y P sex m y p f y p f y p f y     , then 
( ) ( ) ( )m m mp f y P y f y .  
 
By differentiation,  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), { , }j m m j m m jD p f y D P y f y P y D f y j     . If 
( ) ( )( ) ( )k ky yD f y D f y   and lim ( ) lim ( )
k ky y y y
f y f y
 o o
   0mp ! , then 
0 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m y m y m y m yD f y D f y D P y D P y      . 
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Appendix 3: A policy simulation. 
 
In a nonlinear benefit rule those in the higher earnings bracket receive both a lower 
marginal replacement rate and the fixed benefit created by the nonlinear benefit rule 
(segment AB in Figure 6). However, this does not correspond to a lump-sum benefit 
since total benefit depends on the duration of sick leave. In calculating the cost effects of 
reforming the mandatory sickness insurance by changing the number or locations of the 
benefit brackets, one should take into account the effect that operates through changes in 
non-zero fixed benefit created by the nonlinear benefit rule.   
 
ܤ = (ܾଶ(ݓ െݓଵ)+ܾଵݓଵ)1(ݓ െ ݓଵ) + ܾଵݓଵ1(ݓଵ െ ݓ) 
 
On the upper segment, ݓ > ݓଵ, agent receives benefit ܤଶܦ,ܤଶ = ܾଶ(ݓ െ ݓଵ) + ܾଵݓଵ =
ܾଶݓ + (ܾଵ െ ܾଶ)ݓଵwith fixed rate benefit ܤ଴ = (ܾଵ െ ܾଶ)ݓଵ. The consumption while on 
sick leave, ܥ௦ = ܣ + ܤܦ + ݓ(ͳ െ ܦ), and ܣ is the prior level of assets which affects the 
liquidity constraint. Similarly, the agent pays tax to finance benefits according to a linear 
schedule ܶ = ݐݓ, while working. The consumption while working, ܥ௪ = ܣ + ݓ െ ܶ. 
The above formulae hold in the lower segment, ݓ ൑ ݓଵ with ܾଶ = ܾଵ.  
 
A proportional increase in all marginal replacement rates in the benefit system gives 
ߤܤ = (ߤܾଶ(ݓ െ ݓଵ)+ߤܾଵݓଵ)1(ݓ െݓଵ) + ߤܾଵݓଵ1(ݓଵ െݓ), resulting in a proportional 
increase in the fixed rate benefit on the upper segment (segment AC in Figure 6): 
ߤܤଶ = (ߤܾଶݓ + ߤ(ܾଵ െ ܾଶ)ݓଵ)1(ݓ െݓଵ), and ߤܤଵ = ߤܾଵݓ1(ݓଵ െݓ). 
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